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Abstracts 
An  analysis  of  the  impact  of buyer  structure  on  the  profitability  of  U.S.  food 
manufacturing industries shows inconclusive evidence in support of the countervailing power 
hypothesis in these industries.  However, findings show that industries that have high sales to 
other food manufacturing industries, as opposed to sales to the wholesale, retail and other non-
industrial buyers have lower profitability. COUNTERVAILING POWER AND SELLER PERFORMANCE 
IN U.S. FOOD AND TOBACCO MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
1. Introduction 
Although the idea of  "countervailing power" is a commonly known concept in industrial 
economics, it is rarely used to analyze industrial market structure and consequent performance. 
Galbraith (1952) was the first proponent of the idea of buyer power as a potential instrument 
to discipline sellers in a monopoly/oligopoly market. Stigler (1954) criticized the countervailing 
power hypothesis as irrational and lacking logical development and thus argued that it is  not 
a theory. 
In terms of empirical findings, Lustgarten (1975), LaFrance (1979), Martin (1983), and 
more recently Schumacher (1991)  have argued that countervailing power exists  in the U.S. 
manufacturing industries.  In contrast, Ravenscraft (1983) and Cowley (1986) have refuted such 
conclusions.  Such contradicting results have left many confused which was  apparent in the 
comment by Scherer and Ross, "  ... .leaving us perplexed about the conclusion to be drawn from 
such widely divergent results." (535: 1990). 
There are numerous studies analyzing seller structure and performance in the U.S. food 
manufacturing industries; to our knowledge, most of  these studies did not make any attempt to 
analyze the impact of  buyer structure on seller performance in those industries.  In view ofthis, 
the principal objective ofthis study is to analyze the countervailing power hypothesis in the U.S. 
food and tobacco manufacturing sector which is considered composed of  oligopolistic industries. 
Using  industry  level  data  (four-digit  SIC  level),  the  impact of buyer structure  on  seller 
profitability is  tested. 
1 2. Buyer Structure in U.S. Food and Tobacco Industries 
Food and Tobacco industries' output is sold to various types of  buyers (Table 1).  Among 
these, the major buyers are other food manufacturers and retailers including grocery chains, 
mass merchandising chains, food wholesalers and food service etc.  Table 1 shows that the intra-
industry  buyers  and  retailers  together  are  responsible  for  almost  80%  of  total  food 
manufacturing sales of which 60% went to retailers.  Although large grocery chains and food 
wholesalers dominate the procurement of food manufacturers' output it is  unlikely that these 
buyers have significant countervailing power against food manufacturers that sell branded and 
highly promoted products.  Industries that have a high private level component do, however 
experience significant buyer power.  Unfortunately the data on private label penetration by four 
digit industry are not readily available to analyze such impacts empirically. 
Among the industrial buyers those within the food manufacturing sector bought almost 
18% of  the total food and tobacco manufacturing industries' output (Table 1), and the rest (e.g., 
textile, paper & wood, leather, chemical and drug manufacturing etc.) purchased less than one 
percent.  In the context of  this study, only the principal industrial buyers, i.e., those within the 
food and tobacco manufacturing sector are considered. 
3. Model Specification and Data Sample 
Profitability of a firm in an industry is largely based on the ability of the firm to charge 
price above cost.  Market structure on the seller side is known to be an important determinant 
of such  ability.  Keeping  potential  entrants out of an  industry is  also  major task  of the 
established firms if  they are to sustain above-normal profits.  Some commonly recognized entry 
barriers are economies of  scale, size of  capital requirement, comparative levels of  cost functions, 
2 shipments in the sample.  It is  hypothesized that the higher the relative importance of intra-
industry sales, lower will  be the industry profits provided there is  significant countervailing 
power. 
An interaction term between buyer concencration and growth in industry demand is 
defined as  BCR*GROj  = BCRj*GROWI'Hj"  It is  expected that if demand is  weak then stronger 
buyer power (high degree of buyer concentration ratio) would have negative impact on seller 
profit margins; the reverse is expected if  demand is strong.  However, ifboth demand and buyer 
power are weak the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term would likely depend on the 
relative strengths of  buyer power and demand growth thus, its sign remains ambiguous. 
Based on the above discussion, the aim of the empirical analysis is  to test the impact of 
buyer market structure on seller profitability.  The profit function of industry i  is defined as 
IIj  = f  (CR4j,  ADSALEj,  MESj,  GROWI'Hj,  BCRj,  ORDSZj,  BDISPj,  PERFMTj, BCR*GROJ 
(1) 
Presence of significant negative relationship between buyer structure variables andTIj 
would establish the hypothesis that there is countervailing power in the U.S. food and tobacco 
manufacturing industries.  The four buyer structure variables and the interaction term are 
expected to have negative signs while the seller structure variables and the growth variable are 
expected to have positive signs. 
3.2 Data sample 
The principal data used in this study comes from the 1987 Census of  Manufacturers and 
the 1982 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United States.  Two other sources are: the 
5 BAR/LNA Multimedia Service data on food manufacturing industry advertising expenditure in 
1987, and Connor et al.  (154-156: 1985) for economies of  scale (MES) data.  The food industries 
assets data for 1985 were provided by Prof R.  Lopez. 
The analysis is  focused at the 4-digit level of SIC 20 and 21.  However, due to lack of 
advertising data, SIC 2048 (prepared feeds) and SIC 2099 (miscellaneous foods) are excluded 
from the analysis. Moreover, as all outputs of the cigarette and cigar manufacturing industries 
(SIC 2111  and SIC 2121, respectively) go directly to non-industrial buyers making the buyer 
concentration ratio variable (BCR) mathematically undefined, both industries are excluded from 
the analysis. Thus the total number of  sample of food manufacturing industries was 40 for the 
study. 
4. Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis is  presented in Table 2.  It 
shows  the distribution of both dependent and explanatory variables.  A correlation matrix 
among the independent and dependent variables  is  presented in Table 3  to  obtain a  pre-
regression understanding of the relations among variables.  The results show that most of the 
buyer structure variables are negatively correlated to seller profitability, advertising intensity, 
and industry growth.  On the other hand, seller concentration, advertising intensity, minimum 
efficient scale, and industry growth are positively correlated to the Lerner index as expected. 
Regression results of the seller profitability model (eq.  1) is presented in Table 4.  Four 
regression equations were estimated using the SHAZAM program. The squared error term from 
an OLS regression exhibited strong correlation with advertising intensity (ADSALE), therefore, 
that variable was  used to correct the model for heteroscadasticity (see Gujarati, 339: 1988, for 
relevant econometric theory).  Four versions of  the seller profitability model were estimated and 
6 results are presented in Table 4.  Only model (i)  contains the entire set of variables of the 
profitability equation.  The impact of seller structure, market growth, and buyer structure on 
seller profitability was tested through the model (ii), while models (ii) and (iii) show the separate 
effects of a relative sales variable and an interaction term. 
The  results  consistently  show  that seller  concentration  significantly  increases  seller 
profitability. There is abundant literature on the impact of  seller concentration on profitability. 
Demsetz critique notwithstanding, it has been generally agreed that high sellers' concentration 
increases sellers' profits and this study further substantiates that.  Although it lacks consistent 
statistical  significance,  advertising  intensity shows  positive  impact on seller  profitability  in 
concert with the findings of available literature (Connor and Peterson, 1992).  One surprising 
finding here is  that the economies of scale variable (MES) is  not significantly different from 
zero. Although a non-significant scale effect is not uncommon (e.g., Rogers and Petraglia, 1991),MES 
is  often correlated with seller concentration, and has a significant positive impact on profits. 
This result is cited as evidence for the hypothesis that more concentrated markets have higher 
profits because larger firms, at or above MES have lower costs than their smaller counterparts. 
This efficiency argument does not seem to hold for the selected industries in the current study. 
The results relating to  the main task  of this study,  i.e.,  testing the impact of buyer 
structure on seller profitability, are inconclusive.  Although BCR shows the expected negative 
sign in models (i) and (iii),  ORDSZ shows negative coefficient in models (ii) and (iv), andBDISP 
has negative coefficient in model (ii), all these results lack statistical significance.  However, at 
a  lower level of significance (0.20),  both  ORDSZ and BDISP  show countervailing impact on 
seller profitability respectively in models (iv) and (ii).  At the same low level of  significance,BCR 
is  positive showing lack of  stronger buyer power.  Similarly, all these buyer structure variables 
7 also show evidence of  non-significant positive coefficients among the four models.  Keeping only 
the buyer concentration variable in the model (i) to determine whether high positive correlation 
among these three buyer structure variables have reduced the explanatory power of the buyer 
concentration variable, it was found that the BCR coefficient was negative and significant at 0.10 
level of significance. 
The variable PERFMT is statistically significant at both acceptable level (model (i)) and 
a lower level of  significance (0.20 in model (iii)).  It  shows that if  a food manufacturing industry 
increases its sale to other food  manufacturing industries, it will likely to reduce the industry 
profitability.  Such findings may warn food manufacturers against emphasizing industry sales 
instead of consumer packaged goods that can be differentiated. 
Seller profitability is  also influenced by growth in industry sales; the results show that 
increased growth rate will increase industry profitability.  If countervailing power is  prevalent 
and stronger when demand is  weak (Schumacher, 1991), the expected sign of the interaction 
term (GROWTH) would be negative.  However, the current results show the opposite (models 
(i)  and (iv))  meaning a weaker buyer power relative to stronger growth in the U.S.  food and 
tobacco manufacturing industries (almost 15%, from Table 2). 
5. Conclusions 
An analysis of the profitability of U.S.  food  manufacturing industries shows that such 
profitability depends on the market structure on the seller side and on a limited basis on the 
buyer side.  It was  found that the buyer structure variables failed to establish conclusively that 
buyers have significant countervailing power and can discipline sellers in a monopoly/oligopoly 
market.  However,  findings  show  that  industry  that  sell  more  output  to  other  food 
8 manufacturers  have  lower  seller  profitability.  In  conclusion,  the  countervailing  power 
hypothesis  could  not be  proved  conclusively  and  the  question  of the  ability  of buyers  to 
discipline sellers from making above-normal profits still remains indeterminate. It  is fairly clear, 
however  that  commodity  oriented  businesses  are  less  profitable  than  consumer  uriented 
businesses in the food sector. 
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Table 1:  Principal Buyers of Food and Tobacco Manufacturing Industry Output (N =44) 
Buyers  Total  Percent of 
purchases  total sales 
($ million) 
Eating establishments  38,825.65  12.93 
Principal  Amusement establishments  406.40  0.14 
Non-industrial  Institutional buyers 
buyers 
10,127.14  3.37 
Retail buyers  179,650.50  59.84 
Sub-total  229,009.70  76.29 
Principal  Food manufac. buyers  53,745.30  17.90 
industrial 
buyers  Non-food manufac. buyers  1,720.40  0.57 
Sub-total  55,465.70  18.48 
Total •  300,197.80  100.00 
Source:  The  1982 Benchmark  Input-Output Accounts of the  United  States,  Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 1991. 
Note:  * =  sub-totals do not add up to the total because only principal buyers are shown here. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables (N =40) 
Variable name  Mean  St. deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
PCM  0.392  0.184  0.070  0.727 
CR4  0.499  0.209  0.180  0.960 
ADSALE  0.034  0.024  0.000  0.112 
MES  2.95  4.251  0.140  19.77 
GROWTH  14.99  37.87  -56.065  113.99 
BCR  0.016  0.027  0.0002  0.154 
ORDSZ  -4.234  4.678  -12.475  4.755 
BDISP  0.038  0.067  0.86-07  0.309 
PERFMT  21.896  26.69  0.029  92.634 
BCR*GRO  -0.049  1.623  -8.6359  4.434 
11 Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables (N =40) 
PCM  CR4  ADSALE  MES  GROWTH  BCR  ORDSZ  BmSp  PERFMT  BCR*GRO 
PCM  1.00 
CR4  0.333  1.00 
ADSALE  0.319  0.056  1.00 
MES  0.187  0.638  0.147  1.00 
GROWTH  0.370  0.205  0.328  0.363  1.00 
BCR  -0.222  0.306  -0.252  0.401  -0.269  1.00 
ORDSZ  -0.464  0.035  -0.310  0.111  -0.366  0.553  1.00 
Bmsp  -0.378  0.278  -0.238  0.229  -0.289  0.741  0.620  1.00 
PERFMT  -0.453  0.243  -0.209  0.281  -0.229  0.522  0.748  0.864  1.00 
BCR*GRO  0.259  0.044  0.241  0.343  0.546  0.582  -0.196  -0.522  -0.211  1.00 
12 Table 4: Regression results of the Countervailing Power Test (N =40) 
Models / Equations 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
CONSTANT  0.2339***  0.1930***  0.2811 ***  0.1339** 
(3.01)  (3.72)  (3.59)  (2.22) 
0.2844**  0.2949**  0.2956**  0.2820** 
CR4  (2.54)  (2.50)  (2.58)  (2.41) 
ADSALE  1.4564*  0.9277  0.8401  1.5008* 
(1.84)  (1.16)  (1.08)  (1.81) 
MES  -0.3429  -0.3131  0.1794  -0.8674 
(0.49)  (0.50)  (0.26)  (1.29) 
GROWTH  0.1215  0.1972**  0.1833*  0.1502* 
(1.42)  (2.30)  (2.18)  (1.71) 
BCR  -0.4429  1.2758  -0.6783  1.9373 
(0.25)  (0.94)  (0.36)  (1.42) 
ORDSZ  0.0005  -0.0035  0.0055  -0.0097 
(0.06)  (0.62)  (0.66)  (1.46) 
BDISP  1.5201 *  -0.5436  0.4077  0.1666 
(1.70)  (1.39)  (0.54)  (0.29) 
PERFMT  -0.4137* 
(1.92)  \\  -0.3273  \\ 
(1.47) 
BCR*GRO  10.763**  \\  8.8784* 
(2.10)  \\  (1.70) 
R2  0.54  0.44  0.46  0.52 
Note:  ***  =  significant at 0.01;  **  =  significant at 0.05;  *  =  significant at 0.10. 
The reported R 2 is  the squared correlation coefficient between the observed and the predicted 
variable.  The results are corrected for heteroscadasticity.  Values in parenthesis are the absolute 
values of t-ratio. 
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